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Purpose: The paper explores the concept of vengeance as a terrorist motivator.  
Approach: The paper takes a community psychological perspective to examine 
vengeance in a number of forms.   Firstly covering ‘blood vengeance’, it then 
examines vigilantism and death squads as functional examples of vengeful entities, as 
well as the morality of vengeance and the impact of propaganda on vengeance as a 
terrorist motivator.  Finally, both group processes and individual factors relating to the 
promotion and use of vengeance in terrorism are covered. 
Findings:  Vengeance can be conceptualised in a number of ways: as a predisposing 
factor to individual involvement, a factor that contributes to keeping the movement 
‘bound’ together (but which can also negatively affect the group’s strategic logic), a 
factor in the escalation of violent activity through vigilantism, retribution and 
retaliation which can result in a perpetuation of a cycle of violence, and as a moral 
mandate that is ideologically rationalised and justified, with perceptions of 
righteousness and obligation inherent to it.   
Limitations:  The presented research is limited by the scarcely available data.  
Practical implications: Efforts should be made to defuse vengeful motivations by 
tapping into collective identities of communities and incorporating multicultural 
values.  
Social implications: Policy makers should be wary of scoring populist scores by 
ridiculing outgroup/religious elements as that creates potential for vengeful terror 
attacks.  
Originality/value: The paper offers insights by renewing the neglected perspective of 
vengeance in terrorism research.  
Keywords: Vengeance, Terrorism, Vigilantism, Death Squads, Community 
Psychology, Individual and Group Processes 
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Psychology perspectives on community vengeance as a terrorist motivator 
The paper aims to explore terrorism from the perspective of vengeance, defined here 
as the act of punishing or harming someone in return for their perceived baleful action 
against the group one identifies with (i.e. the ingroup). The psychological process of 
becoming involved in terrorism is multi-faceted (also referred to as “radicalization”; 
see Horgan 2013) that involves a series of push and pull factors. While the media 
sometimes attribute terrorists’ motivations solely to their religious beliefs (Dawkins, 
2006), none of the 9/11 plane bombers or Madrid train bombers, and only one of the 
London Underground bombers were known to have had religious upbringings or had 
attended religious schools (Ginges, Atran, Sachdeva, & Medin, 2011). Although 
religion may be used as an ideological justification for a political endeavour, it is a 
poor explanation of terrorism roots.   
Early attempts to understand involvement in terrorism also rested on the 
assumption that they were “special” or different from members of the general 
population (i.e., those who would not engage in extremist violence). Such research 
sought to identify psychological “markers” (such as specific manifestations mental 
illness, narcissism, psychopathy or suicidal tendencies; Lasch, 1979; Lankford, 2013) 
or demographic differences (Sageman, 2004). However, these studies did not rely on 
valid behavioural measures, lacked methodological rigor and failed to prove that those 
involved in terrorism possessed higher levels of these qualities that the general 
population (Horgan, 2014). Similarly, as root causes are often speculated upon, 
poverty has also been found to be a poor predictor of terrorist involvement (Atran, 
2011). As any single “silver bullet” explanations are inherently problematic, 
psychologists have increasingly looked to more process-based models that focus on 
(amongst other elements) close social networks (Sageman, 2008), perceived foreign 
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meddling (Pape, 2005), hardship under occupation (Pape & Feldman, 2010), a sense 
of national humiliation (Merari, 2010), and frustrated expectations (Ginges et al, 
2011). These appear to have a far better explanatory value in understanding extremist 
resentment. Building upon these approaches, and integrating research across several 
relevant fields of study, in this paper we focus on the need for vengeance (i.e., 
punishment or retribution for perceived or imagined injury, injustice or wrong 
suffered by the ingroup (Baumeister, 1997) –  as a process that drives an individuals’ 
motivation to be involved in extremist activity. While research (and indeed popular 
press) has discussed the role of revenge in the instigation of terrorism (e.g., 
Richardson, 2006), research to date has not fully explored this process.  
This paper takes the perspective that vengeance is a terrorist motivator, 
identifying it as a potential driving force (albeit one of many) that can be used to 
facilitate initial involvement and continued engagement in terrorism at both an 
individual and group levels. Vengeance has been used in a variety of settings for why 
people engage in anti-social or violent actions (e.g., fire-setting; Barnoux & Gannon, 
2014). Importantly, it is important to acknowledge that is only a minority of 
individuals engaging in actual acts of violence as most terror group members offer 
only support that may take logistical, financial or planning forms (Palasinski & 
Bowman-Grieve, 2017). 
While the desire for vengeance is not institutional and stems from the 
emotions of the social members that comprise the group, particularly its leaders, it can 
be manifested in actions and activities which are strategic and logical; there are 
functional aspects to vengeance (Van Goozen, Van de Poll, Sergeant, Sergeant, & 
Van Goozen, 2013). However, even in such cases where vengeance is functional and 
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strategic, an emotional imperative can be recognised as a driving force, with moral 
justifications constructed within in-group discourses as central to this.  
Vengeance in circumstances related to terrorism (defined here as the threat or 
use of violence to achieve political goals) and terrorist movements usually occurs “on 
behalf of comrades or even the constituency the terrorist aspires to represent” 
(Crenshaw, 1981, p. 394). Examples of these include acts of violence by such 
movements as the FLN in Algeria in response to the French government execution of 
FLN prisoners; and Irish Republican acts of vengeance in response to acts carried out 
by the British military in Northern Ireland, such as the firing on civil rights 
demonstrators on Bloody Sunday. Thus, while the declaration of violence is often the 
prerogative of the state, what distinguishes terrorism from other forms of political 
violence is often the political environment itself (Crenshaw, 2000).  Anecdotal 
evidence from individual explanations of involvement also supports the role of 
vengeance in this process, for example Michael Collins’ decision to join the Irish 
Republican Army; and Michael Baumann’s decision to join the Red Army Faction 
(Silke 2003). Bloom’s (2012) research on the involvement on women in violent 
extremist organizations also specifically identifies “revenge” for the loss of a loved 
one as a motivator for involvement.  
Despite personal motives being intertwined with societal and organizational 
ones, however, it does not seem that the latter alone are enough to motivate potential 
terrorists at an individual level. It appears that the experience of individual 
traumatization and humiliation is also exploited by terror-sponsoring organizations to 
radicalise people with the partial aim to avenge the alleged loss, and in so doing, fight 
for ‘the cause’ (Speckhard &Akhmedova, 2006).  Thus, as with many other risk 
factors, far more individuals will experience the risk factor that will engage in acts of 
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terrorism. That said, while acknowledging that (1) vengeance is not a single, causal 
explanation for involvement in terrorism and (b) the role of vengeance is likely to 
interact with a host of other social, personal and political factors experienced by the 
individual, the role of vengeance identified elsewhere coupled with the lack of direct 
exploration of the topic warrants this research.  
The desire for vengeance should not be limited to explanations of terrorist 
actions and activities; actors within governments are not immune from the desire to 
seek retribution for acts carried out against them and their citizens.  Throughout 
history, acts of terrorism have elicited emotional responses from governments who 
feel pressure to react swiftly and with force; these measures are often widely 
supported by the public these governments represent (Silke, 2003). Although such 
forceful responses are proposed to act as a deterrent for future violence, in many cases 
they can have the opposite effect, facilitating the principle of reciprocity (Newman & 
Lynch, 1987) and acting as a driving force for further vengeful acts, thus perpetuating 
a cycle of violence that can escalate over time.  
In this paper, a range of understandings of vengeance, identifiable within the 
sphere of terrorism and based on the ‘desired outcomes’ of the vengeful act, which 
have some explanatory value as a terrorist motivator, will be discussed. This list is not 
exhaustive, however, as it is used here to frame a community psychology discussion 
on vengeance as a terrorist motivator as it relates to blood vengeance, vigilantism, 
death squads, individual explanations, moral justifications, and group solidarity.  
Blood Vengeance 
It may sound ironic that the classic definition of "blood vengeance" in the West has 
been retaliatory violence among the very Catholic Italian Cosa Nostra (Agius, 2016). 
Vengeance can be defined as “the infliction of harm in return for a perceived injury or 
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insult or as simply getting back at another person” (Cota‐McKinley, Woody, & Bell, 
2001, p.343), which is related to a number of factors, such as righting a perceived 
wrong, deterring future injustices or promoting one’s own self-worth through a 
vengeful action (Cota-McKinley et al., 2001). An important element of the desire to 
carry out an act of vengeance is the willingness to make personal sacrifices in order to 
do so (Cota-McKinley et al., 2001). Similarly, the potential opportunity to exact 
retribution can be a catalyst motivating interest in joining a terrorist movement 
(Horgan & Horgan, 2004) aimed at restoring the balance the balance of suffering 
(Van Goozen et al., 2013, p. 272). 
Current research suggests that some groups are more prone to vengeance than 
others.  For example, men were found to hold more positive attitudes toward 
vengeance than women, with young people more prepared to act to achieve 
vengeance than older people (Cota-McKinley et al., 2001).  Similarly, religious 
beliefs may also affect attitudes to vengeance, with more religious individuals 
showing more approval for vengeful attitudes (Silke, 2003).  In a study examining the 
psychological responses of young Arabs to vengeance, in particular what they refer to 
as blood vengeance (Al-Krenawi, Slonim-Nevo, Maymon, & Al-Krenawi, 2001), it 
was found that the role of cultural and societal norms in sustaining a cycle of violence 
based on vengeance was important. The authors identified blood vengeance as a 
specific phenomenon in Arab societies, which differs from other acts of ongoing 
violence within the broader conflict, and which was found to be a long-standing Arab 
tradition rooted in the mainstream culture of the people involved.   
In fact, the Arabic term for Vengeance, ‘Thaar’ means ‘to ask for his blood’ 
and/or ‘to kill the killer’. Because the term is so culturally embedded within the Arab 
world, seeking revenge is considered, at least by some, to be a ‘right’ or ‘duty’. 
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However, it is not necessarily conceptualised on an individual level, with one person 
seeking vengeance for another, but rather as a means of promoting group action, so 
that the group is responsible for enacting vengeance to restore symmetry lost through 
the perceived wrong suffered by the ingroup (Jabbūr, Jabbūr, & Conrad, 2006). 
Consequently, if a male group member is killed, then a grievance against the group as 
a whole is believed to have been committed (Ginat, 1987), and retribution must be 
achieved by killing a member of the offending group in return; if a female is killed 
then tradition dictates that four males from the offending group should be killed in 
revenge.  Additionally, if the murderer is female, then it is the duty of a female 
member of the aggrieved group to seek vengeance.  Because blood vengeance in Arab 
society has become so culturally entrenched and embedded, it has become a 
normative reaction under specific circumstances and those who choose to carry out 
acts of vengeance, like the attacks on the headquarters of the French magazine Charlie 
Hebdo in 2015, are often considered to be heroes, praised for their self-sacrifice and 
elevated to a status of martyrdom (Al-Krenawi, & Graham, 1997).  
Of course, vengeance is not limited to specific cultures and is recognised as a 
universal human phenomenon (Crombag, Rassin, & Horselenberg, 2003), 
purposefully driven by factors, such as the desire to equalize power (Van Goozen , 
2013), to deter the infliction of future harm (Van Goozen, 2013) and to avenge 
humiliation (Lindeer , 2001).  
The importance of group, organisational and community psychology is 
apparent here in relation to a ‘collective identity’, which can be used to promote, 
induce and encourage hatred and engagement in acts of violence against others (Post, 
2010).  As violence in a political setting has an aspect of sociability, which is 
equally true of direct action groups, paramilitaries, terrorist cells, or 
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governments, it is worth acknowledging a related approach of social identity 
theory. Social Identity theory (Reicher, 1987; 1997) has recently been applied to the 
study of crowd dynamics, in which, crowd events are a function of the evolving 
interaction between the police and the present crowd (Earl et al., 2003). The basic 
premise here is that individual behaviour shifts from an autonomous personal identity, 
towards the contextually specified social identity (Reicher, 1984, 1987) as a function 
of dyadic inter-group interactions (Tajfel, 1982, Turner et al., 1987).  
Thus, the collective identity of the crowd determines the normative boundaries 
for appropriate action (Reicher et al., 2004; Reicher et al., 2007). The Extended Social 
Identity Model (ESIM) emphasises the role of inter-group encounters in shaping 
crowd behaviour. Collective action is therefore a function of the social relations 
facing crowd participants, rather than individual pathology (Le Bon, 1985). 
Henceforth, the dyadic inter-group interaction holds pervasive influence over social 
identities, redefining the shape of collective action (Stott, Hutchinson & Drury, 2001). 
Motivation for violence against the “outgroup”, for example, stems from vengeance 
for behaviours by the “out-group” that are deemed illegitimate and indiscriminate by 
the “in-group”. The promotion of collective identity is of course not limited to 
explanations of blood vengeance but can be applied more broadly to the group and 
community psychology explanations of terrorist behaviour to follow later in this 
paper.  
Vengeance and Vigilantism 
Vengeance might also be well discussed as a form of ‘vigilantism’. Vigilantism is 
most often taken to refer to the use of violence by individuals seeking to take the law 
into their own hands for grievances suffered by them or others known to them, thus 
fitting with most definitions of vengeance.  Taking a criminological perspective, six 
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necessary features have been  associated with vigilantism: (i) it involves planning and 
premeditation; (ii) engagement is voluntary; (iii) it is a form of ‘autonomous 
citizenship’; (iv) it uses or threatens the use of force; (v) it arises when an established 
order is under threat from the transgression of institutionalized norms; (vi) it aims to 
control crime or other social infractions by offering assurances (or ‘guarantees’) of 
security both to participants and to others (Johnston , 1996). Arguably, these features 
of vigilantism can be applied to a specific set of behaviours often employed by 
terrorist movements and paramilitary organisations.  Vigilantism of a paramilitary 
nature is most often manifested at the extreme end of the vigilante behaviour scale, 
(e.g. beatings, shootings, expulsions and executions).  
Acts of vigilantism carried out by terrorist movements may be seen as more 
‘directed’ perhaps than other forms of terrorist activity, i.e. the acts of violence are not 
directed at ‘innocent bystanders’, but rather at specific individuals who might see 
themselves or be considered as potential ‘legitimate’ targets due to their perceived 
involvement in certain types of ‘unacceptable’ behaviours (i.e. those behaviours 
deemed unacceptable by the paramilitary organisation and/or the community it claims 
to represent), thus warranting acts of revenge (Silke, 2000).  
Thus, acts of vigilante violence are commonly used for disciplining and/or 
punishing in-group members who have digressed in some form, and for punishing 
out-group members for acts which have injured, harmed, humiliated or threatened the 
in-group. For example, in Northern Ireland, vigilante terrorism is seen to be carried 
out (in a high proportion of cases) against those ‘known’ to have committed crimes 
and/or engaged in anti-social behaviours, drug dealing, informing, joyriding, sex 
offences and burglary (Silke 2000). Similarly, such vigilantism may be directed 
inwards upon in-group members in response to some unacceptable deviation of 
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behaviour from group norms, which is evidenced by biographies of former IRA 
members (Collins, & McGovern, 1998). Vigilante terrorism of this nature often 
requires the formation of ‘punishment squads’; Individuals who form part of these 
squads are required to carry out violent, action against individuals who may very well 
be known to them within their community.   
Death Squads 
Death Squads are clandestine, often paramilitary, groups who carry out assassinations 
and other violent acts (torture, rape arson, bombing etc.) against clearly specified 
individuals or groups of people (Campbell, 2000), often as acts of revenge and 
vengeance for perceived wrong doing.  Death squads can be differentiated from 
vigilante groups, with the primary difference being the direct involvement of the state 
often associated with death squads. However, in reality there may be considerable 
overlap between these categories (Campbell, 2000).  For example, some death squads, 
like vigilante groups, are formed to combat crime and uphold social norms through 
acts of violence and threat, while vigilante groups, primarily initiated by private/civil 
interests, may also involve state/elite influence.   
For both vigilante groups and death squads, instigation and participation 
generally have a covert nature and a murderous outcome (Campbell, 2000). 
Furthermore, death squad activity may be portrayed as spontaneous acts of 
vigilantism in order to hide the true sponsorship of those involved, for example the 
South African government sponsored and encouraged vigilante groups to act as death 
squads during the time of apartheid in South Africa (Campbell, 2000). Similarly, 
vigilante groups, partly initiated and sustained by the government, may develop their 
own political agenda and turn into lawless organizations terrorizing citizens and the 
state itself (Schuberth, 2013). 
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As with punishment squads, death squads have also been identified in use by 
paramilitary organisations, such as terrorist movements, for example the Ulster 
Defence Association (UDA) of Northern Ireland in collaboration with security forces 
carried out the murder of the lawyer Pat Finucane in 1979 (Rolston, 2005).  An 
important distinction between death squads and vigilante groups is related to the goal 
of the action.  For vigilantes, the targets chosen are often instrumental in nature, 
serving a symbolic purpose and sending a message of revenge to a wider audience.  
Alternatively, while death squads use repressive violence to induce compliance 
through fear, the main aim of their activity is killing (Mason & Krane, 1989).  
Interestingly, targeted killings aimed at ‘decapitating’ militant groups suggest that 
they tend to redirect violence from military to civilian targets, thus lending empirical 
weight to the role of vengeance as a terrorist motivator (Abrahms, & Mierau , 2015).  
Moral Justifications 
In order for vengeance to become an entrenched emotional motivator within a society 
or given movement, it must be justified and promoted over time. To this end, 
vengeance becomes embedded through the promoted normative values of the society 
and the specific propaganda of the terrorist movement.  Whether terrorism is part of a 
wider campaign of revolution or a free standing conflict form, its political objectives 
can only be reached by a complex psychological-military process in which 
propaganda and violence are intertwined (Rapoport & Alexander, 1989). This use of 
propaganda can become more apparent following government responses to the 
movement that are perceived as particularly harsh, thus perceived as warranting a 
vengeful reaction.  
As part of a propaganda campaign, justificatory accounts that promote 
vengeance provide the individual and group with the moral imperative they may 
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require to justify their actions and activities. Moral imperatives can be promoted as 
obligations within terrorist discourses (such as ‘blood vengeance’), minimising 
personal culpability in the very act of vengeance, with blame and responsibility for 
actions taken laid firmly in the hands of the ‘enemies’.  Psychologically, this is a 
powerful position in which to perceive oneself, for with no belief in personal blame 
there is no responsibility for one’s own actions, therefore any action, no matter how 
abhorrent, can be undertaken and justified.  Belief in being morally correct, and 
therefore morally obligated to act, can be assessed most comprehensively in terms of 
moral convictions and mandates.  
Moral convictions form the basis for the strong and absolute beliefs and 
attitudes best referred to as moral mandates; they have a high action potential because 
they are based on ‘oughts’ or ‘shoulds’, and are closely connected to people’s sense of 
themselves as decent, good people (Higgins, 1987). A commitment to a moral 
mandate allows the individual to classify actions (of in-group/out-group members, 
perceived enemies etc.) into mutually exclusive categories of legitimacy versus 
illegitimacy (or fundamental transgression). As such, judgements and actions will be 
perceived as legitimate and fair when they are consistent with the individual’s moral 
mandates (Skitka, & Houston, 2001). 
Traditionally, moral judgements have been framed within a rationalist 
perspective, which argues that moral judgements are primarily reached through a 
process of reasoning and reflection (Kohlberg, 1969).  However, the social intuitionist 
approach argues that moral judgments may be more intuitive in nature than rational, 
and that the reasoning processes involved in moral judgments are post hoc rather than 
a priori (Haidt , 2001). Although the rationalist model of moral judgement cannot 
account for why a person would ‘know’ something is wrong without being able to 
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explain why, it may be argued that many of our moral judgements are based on 
cultural and societal norms which allow us to make such intuitive judgements.  
Nevertheless, a priori reasoning may have a role to play as the driving force behind 
seemingly intuitive judgements (Pizarro & Bloom , 2003).  
Although further research in this area is recommended, the notion of intuitive 
rather than rationalisation processes playing the dominant role in moral judgements is 
useful in further conceptualising the moral imperative that fuels the belief in the 
righteousness of seeking vengeance and the subsequent rationalisations which are 
used to justify involvement in a terrorist movement to achieve this aim.  This model 
of moral intuition is also comparable to the mechanisms outlined in the theory of 
moral disengagement (Bandura, 2017) i.e. that post-hoc rationalisations are often used 
to justify behaviour undertaken for moral purposes in order to minimize cognitive 
dissonance and guilt (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996). 
The moral conviction of the righteousness of terrorist movements’ goals often 
becomes embedded and entrenched to such a degree as to legitimate any range of 
actions to achieve them.  Terrorist organisations have demonstrated their capacity to 
adopt and adapt moral mandates justifying their righteousness and supporting their 
behaviour and action, for example Al Qaeda which is based on a fundamental belief 
in their moral mandate requiring ‘jihad’. The moral mandate of ‘jihad’ (as espoused 
by Violent Islamic Jihadis) not only justifies and legitimates the actions of each 
member of this movement, but the rationalisations used are fast becoming embedded 
within the wider support community which in turn become potential recruits for the 
movement. Speeches and communiqués from Islamic Fundamentalists, such as Al 
Zawahiri provide ample examples of the importance of ‘vengeance’ to discourses 
central to promoting support for the holy war against infidels (Berner, 2007). 
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Acts of vengeance are a clear statement that grievances or injustices will not 
be tolerated and that retaliatory action is obligated because of a moral conviction of 
righteousness.  If terrorism is used as an act of vengeance, the message is quite clear 
and achieves at least the fulfilment of vengeance for the terrorist movement and for 
the individual motivated, at least in part, by such a moral mandate. This can 
subsequently be further used by the terrorist movement for propaganda purposes; i.e. 
with vengeance achieved, the act itself is considered successful and this can be used 
to boost internal morale and promote further support for the movement, their goals 
and activities.  
Terrorism, Vengeance and Propaganda 
Terrorism has often been referred to as ‘propaganda of the deed’; a strategy used to 
attract attention and influence audiences.  However, the propaganda of terrorism is not 
bound to the act of terrorism alone but rather is a more complex strategy used by 
terrorist movements not only in their activities but also in their communications with 
the public, their perceived adversaries and also with their own supporters, members 
and potential recruits.  There are many different forms of propaganda and means by 
which this strategy of psychological warfare can be used (Garth, Jowlett & 
O’Donnell, 1986).  
Terrorist movements predominantly use propaganda to draw attention to 
themselves, their ideology, grievances and goals.  It is essential for the terrorist 
movement to have a successful propaganda campaign which synchronises itself with 
the actions and activities of the movement.  Without it, the movement has little hope 
of influencing public opinion, changing perceptions and ultimately achieving their 
long-term goals.  Using discourses of vengeance and retribution to justify 
involvement and action serve this propaganda strategy well. This can be exemplified 
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by the calls of the Hutu extremists for the killing of ‘Tutsi cockroaches’ in Rwanda in 
1994.  The dehumanised Tutsis were seen as a taller lighter-skin minority outgroup 
demonised in propaganda as alien oppressors.  Given that most people try to keep a 
positive self-concept, the sudden drop in their living standards can question the 
concept. As people also tend to look for simple answers to complex problems, 
scapegoating others can then easily follow (Pizarro, & Bloom, 2003).  
In terms of implications, it is worth drawing here on social categorisation 
theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Proposing that social 
categories are fluid and subject to contextualised change, its employment was already 
proven to meaningfully recategorise a former outgroup as part of the ingroup 
(Palasinski, Granat, Seol, & Bowman-Grieve, 2014). Thus, the vengeance motive 
against indiscriminate outgroup civilians might be potentially undermined by ingroup-
inducing verbal primes that redefine the supposedly ‘evil others’ as sharing at least 
some characteristics of the ‘justice’-seeking ingroup.  One way to put it into practice 
might be online counter-terror communication (Palasinski, & Bowman-Grieve, 2017). 
Such communication in the form of webcasts or podcasts can challenge the rhetoric of 
cherry-picking merchants of hatred or divert some of the street warfare to rhetorical 
exchanges in cyberspace. This might be exemplified by branding indiscriminate 
attacks on the ‘evil (outgroup) others’ as being against the fundamental values of the 
ingroup or as having an adverse boomerang effect on the ingroup, and feeding the 
ever-escalating vicious circle of vengeance.   
In terms of group dynamics, vengeance can play a key role in both the 
development and sustenance of group cohesion and solidarity.  This can be seen 
particularly in cases where the perceived enemy of the terrorist movement retaliates 
violently, thus providing the justifications necessary for the further use of terrorism to 
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achieve the movements’ goals.  Violent retaliation by perceived enemies can be used 
to the advantage of the propagandist to promote a mortality salience effect, whereby 
the idea of death becomes more cognitively available.  Such an effect is linked to an 
increase in support for extremism, particularly when it is linked to group identity 
(Pyszczynski, Abdollahi, Solomon, Greenberg, Cohen, & Weise, 2006).  
Just as ‘successful operations’ of the terrorist group are reported online (e.g., 
on Jihadi websites and their discussion forums), so too are the operations of the 
‘enemy’, particularly when these operations result in loss of life (e.g., accidental 
civilian deaths resulting from drone strikes).  Such information can be easily 
manipulated within the propaganda machine to justify and legitimate the continued 
and sustained use of terrorism in the name of vengeance, retaliation and ‘justice’.  
The Islamic Resistance Support Association website, for example, at one time 
provided access to information detailing “Israeli aggressions”, which included 
monthly reports from 1998 to 2003 detailing experiences ranging from invasions of 
airspace to street conflict, numbers of wounded and killed, and information on 
bombings and shootings.  The following information table (Table 1) taken again from 
the Islamic Resistance Support Association website (2006) provides an account of 
‘enemy aggression’ to present readers with ‘evidence’ of the outgroup evilness.  
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Table 1 
Table of Enemy ‘Aggressions’ 
Massacre Date Place Victim's & number 
Qana April 18-1996 
Qana village - South 
Lebanon 
- 102 persons killed including children, 
women and old men  
(Video Clip) 
Mansouri April 13-1996 
Mansouri village - South 
Lebanon 
Six martyrs including three children  
(Video Clip) 
Janta 
December 22-
1998 
Janta village – Beqaa 
- seven martyrs (a mother and   
her six children).  
(Video Clip) 
Sohmor 12-4-1996 
Sohmor village - South 
Lebanon 
- nine martyrs including four children 
School bus 21-3-1994 
Nabatieh- South 
Lebanon  
- two martyrs and 28 wounded all of them 
are children 
Nabatieh El-
Fawqa 
18-4-1996 Nabatieh city 
Martyrdom of a mother and her seven 
children  
 
Providing information of this nature, which recounts the ‘aggression’ of the 
enemy in particular, is an important feature of terrorist websites as it promotes and 
supports the justifications for pursuing aggressive retaliation. The creation of a 
discourse of this nature serves to further polarise viewpoints and demonise the enemy, 
thus legitimising the use of violence in return.  In recounting the attacks made by the 
enemy (in this case governments and policy makers) the terrorist movement can argue 
that their own legitimacy is maintained because their decisions to retaliate are 
perceived as being made in self-defence.  The responsibility of further attacks made 
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by the terrorist organisation, in which innocents may be killed, is thus laid firmly with 
the enemy.  
The reference to those killed as ‘martyrs’ is particularly noteworthy as the 
term endows  the statements with a sense of sanctity, and in so doing provides moral 
justifications for retaliation. The encouragement to act in vengeance is promoted in 
the name of lost martyrs, legitimising the decision to become further involved in 
terrorist activities.  Additionally, the inclusion of (decontextualized and carefully 
edited) video footage fragments of some of the attacks mentioned adds a sense 
factuality and truth.  
A promoted and sustained desire for vengeance, particularly when propagated 
effectively within a movement, makes it difficult for members to withdraw their 
support or membership. Although vengeance alone may not be enough to sustain 
group solidarity and cohesion (especially when other factors, such as disillusionment 
with society, withdrawal from family and friends, ideological commitment and 
involvement in violent activity are taken into consideration), it is not surprising that 
group cohesiveness will reach a high level, so much so that disengagement becomes 
difficult, if not impossible.  
However, vengeance can also have a negative role in relation to the group 
processes of the terrorist movement, particularly in terms of the internal dynamics of 
the group and their strategic decision making processes.  For example, high levels of 
group solidarity and cohesiveness, facilitated not only by the desire for vengeance but 
also by the fact that the group is illegal (and operating underground) can have a 
number of results.  Such a group will be prone to increased levels of anxiety and 
decreased ability to identify alternatives and to assess outcomes. These effects can 
lead to groupthink, whereby the need for consensus overtakes the need to obtain 
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accurate information to make appropriate decisions, which in turn can result in less 
rational or logical choices, such as higher levels of risk-taking (Crenshaw, 1992). 
The Psychology of Group Solidarity 
Vengeance in the group dynamics context is perhaps best conceptualised in terms of 
how it facilitates specific group processes which seek to internally strengthen the 
group in terms of cohesion and solidarity. Vengeance can play a key role in terrorist 
movements both in relation to the decision to use terrorism in the first place and 
subsequently to continue with the use of terrorism to achieve set goals.  
Drawing upon the pioneering research showing how a group’s behaviour and 
the influence of its leaders depended on identification and dis-identification (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986), it appears that to engage in violence on behalf of the (seemingly hurt) 
in-group, one must identify with the in-group and demonise or dehumanise the 
outgroup. Becoming a part of the in-group, facilitates the adaptation of a new 
collective identity, potentially providing individual members with anonymity and 
diminishing their sense of personal responsibility. It is the group and/or its leaders, 
not individual group members that then become accountable for action.  Thus, 
individual behaviour becomes less inhibited, anger towards the perceived outgroup no 
longer has to be suppressed and emotions become more intense and spread fast.  
These community psychological processes of high group cohesiveness and 
conformity contribute to group polarization, which can in turn result in a ‘risky shift’ 
of attitudes and behaviours supportive of vengeful acts.  Couple this with 
deindividuation of group members and a contagion effect, along with severe 
repercussions for deviating outside of group norms supportive of acts of vengeance, 
and what is created is a potentially widely justified and legitimised perspective of 
violent retribution.  
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As a consequence, moral constraints (e.g., getting non-target bystanders, like 
children, caught up in the cross fire) can become loosened, and independent judgment 
decreased, compromising the boundaries of the self that becomes heavily affected by 
the concept of the extremist and retribution-seeking ‘we’ (Staub, 2013). It is quite 
clear, therefore, that more likely than not, it is not a personality defect, but the person-
changing dynamic of one’s perception of the in-group that turns people into fanatics 
(Atran, 2011). In this way, radicalisation can be driven by rifts among groups that 
‘merchants of hatred’ seek to create, exploit and exacerbate (Clayton, Ballif-Spanvill, 
Barlow, & Orton, 2003). 
Vengeance and Individual Accounts of Involvement 
Discourses of vengeance can be used to promote and justify the perpetuation, and in 
some cases, escalation of violence over time. To that end, the extent to which 
vengeance and the desire to seek retribution play a role in terrorist motivation is best 
considered by examining the discourses that support and justify the use of this 
strategy by both individual supporters and members of terrorist movements, as well as 
the groups they claim to represent.  
Vengeance has an important role to play in both recruitment and involvement 
processes. The desire to exact revenge can be an influential factor for individual 
involvement, and terrorist movements use recruitment procedures that target areas or 
individuals who are known to have been negatively affected by experiences (such as 
conflict in the case of nationalist separatist groups), and for whom vengeance may be 
a factor contributing to their decision to become involved in some capacity within a 
terrorist movement.  While some attention has been paid to the potential for victims of 
terrorism (and/or vigilantism) to become terrorists themselves (Silke, 2000), it is 
apparent from examining individual accounts of involvement that situational factors 
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which result in a desire to seek revenge have a relevant role to play in this process.  
Vengeance can be recognised in individual accounts of involvement and also 
recognised in the propaganda campaigns of terrorist movements. 
Analysis of online discourses created within virtual communities in support of 
terrorist movements contributes supporting evidence of the role of vengeance in 
personal decisions to become involved in terrorist activities (Bowman Grieve , 2006).  
For example, in a set of virtual community contributions to the topic “How did you 
become a Republican?”, taken from a larger project investigating online discourses of 
Irish Republicanism, many responses included personal histories and accounts that 
identified the desire for vengeance or retribution as a contributing factor in the 
decision to become involved, at levels ranging from online support to more active 
support. Whether all contributions to the thread are true accounts of pathways to 
involvement, or not, what is identifiable nonetheless is a discourse supportive of 
involvement based on ideas of revenge and vengeance.  
Interestingly, individual members of this virtual community, who identify 
vengeance or the need for revenge as an influencing factor in their decision to become 
part of a terrorist movement, and who limit themselves to online involvement in 
particular, appear to have found an outlet for their desire for retribution without 
having to become directly involved in the acts of terrorism themselves. This may 
indicate that the supporter of a terrorist movement may perceive involvement, even at 
any level of online support, as a means of exacting revenge on the perceived enemy 
i.e. that any activity in support of the terrorist movement is a form of retribution and 
an outlet for vengeful emotions.  
Similarly, online activity in support of a terrorist movement allows the 
individual to retain relative anonymity, thus affording them the opportunity to be part 
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of a terrorist movement without necessarily disrupting their day-to-day lives. In this 
way, an individual supporting a terrorist movement for can participate (without fear of 
further retribution) in the promotion and dissemination of the justificatory discourses 
and propaganda that promote the movement their ideology and goals. Additionally, 
they may become involved in fundraising and recruitment activities with the potential 
to become further involved both online and in everyday life. The Internet facilitates 
the potential of the ‘armchair warrior’ whose involvement can be limited to online 
activity, but who nevertheless perceives him/herself to be contributing to the 
movement and in so doing achieves satisfaction in such activity as a means of 
retribution and revenge.  
Importantly, revenge does not have to involve direct action – it can also be 
passive, for example in the form of silence, turning a blind eye to tell-tale extremist 
activities and non-reporting of threats to authorities.  Such hostile passivity can be 
easily bred, for example by resentment towards interrogating airport security staff that 
may inadvertently question the identity of British home-coming Muslims 
(Blackwood, Hopkins, & Reicher, 2015). This, in turn, may likely humiliate and 
alienate them, potentially discouraging them from sharing vital intelligence, and in 
some cases at least, might push some of them on the pathway towards a new dignity-
restoring extremism.  The vicious circle of revenge-driven extremism, then, starts 
with the minorities’ need to belong or be treated equally, misrecognition, 
disengagement and dis-identification.  In other words, a tiny section of the minority 
group uses hate and violence to provoke majority leaders to start surveillance against 
all minority group members, resulting in a self-fulfilling prophecy.  This can be 
exemplified by the Patriot Act, which was signed into law by President George W. 
Bush in response to the September 11 attacks, equipping the US government with the 
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powers to search various communications, such as email, telephone records and 
medical records. Its counter-terrorism impact is still debatable, controversial and 
divisive (Bullock, Haddow, & Coppola, 2011). As we see terrorists as aggressors and 
ourselves as defenders, they see us as aggressors and themselves as defenders.   
Conclusions 
From a psychological perspective, vengeance can be conceptualised in a number of 
ways, as a predisposing factor to individual involvement or a factor that contributes to 
keeping the movement ‘bound’ together, but which can also negatively affect the 
group’s strategic logic. Vengeance can also be a factor in the escalation of violent 
activity through vigilantism, retribution and retaliation, which can result in a 
perpetuation of a cycle of violence; and as a moral mandate that is ideologically 
rationalised and justified, with perceptions of righteousness and obligation inherent to 
it.  Certainly, the perception of vengeance as an emotive force with the potential to 
influence behaviour warrants further consideration. Future research might consider 
questioning why some groups favour vengeance discourses more strongly than others 
or why some individuals are more motivated by vengeance tropes than others. Other 
studies might explore the correlations between widely publicised populist political 
statements questioning religious elements and follow-up terror attacks. 
Propaganda (& auto-propaganda) campaigns that effectively use the potential 
desire of group members (& prospective recruits) to seek revenge and exact 
retribution (and which may provide, in so doing, the justifications required to counter 
the cognitive dissonance that may be associated with involvement in such violent 
activity), arguably have a powerful role to play in the continued and potentially 
escalated use of violence and terrorism over time. As exemplified by terrorism 
campaigns in Iraq, Chechnya, Palestine, Syria and Turkey, independence-driven 
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nationalistic conflicts involving an occupying out-group that is perceived as hostile 
facilitate sustained waves of suicide terrorism aimed at exacting revenge on the out-
group even when in-group members get caught up in the cross-fire.  Such waves can 
be brought to an end only if the conflicts are successfully resolved on both political 
and individual levels, and when vengeful motivations are defused by tapping into 
collective identities of communities and incorporating multicultural values.  
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